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Abstract
The consequences of Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment epit-
omized in his treatment of the term ‘Pegasus’ in “On What There Is” are
evaluated in terms of Quine’s own work, in particular in “The Variable”
and “Variables Explained Away”. There is a cost to maintaining this
criterion with regard to the empirical consequences of some non-existent
objects, given considerations prompted by Quine’s holism. This cost can
be reduced by adopting a noneist position according to which non-existent
objects can be values of bound variables as well.
Among the criticisms of Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment encap-
sulated in the slogan “to be is to be the value of a bound variable”, the sharpest
attacks come from Richard Routley [15], supported by Graham Priest [2], both
of whom espouse a position inspired by Meinong and designated “noneism”,
according to which non-existent objects can be values of a bound variable as
well. Routley bluntly accuses Quine of theft, of stealing important terminology
from our domain of discourse with which we express basic facts about the world
concerning non-existence [16, p. 151].
The criticisms by Routley and Priest appear primarily to be external to
Quine, namely arguments to show that Quine’s criterion is illegitimate. By
contrast, this paper takes an internal approach and explores this criterion more
broadly throughout Quine’s wider corpus to investigate the consequences of this
early slogan in the context of Quine’s mature philosophy.
One of Quine’s key assumptions appears to be that non-existent objects have
a negligible impact on explanatory theories. The investigation presented here
argues that non-existent objects do have practical consequences for existing
objects, and any effort to explain them away have theoretical consequences
that may not be acceptable when more than mere ontological parsimony is
considered.
In his 1948 paper “On What There Is” [3], Quine is concerned with the
issue of disagreement with other philosophers over what exists, particularly with
philosophers who might think that using a name commits Quine to some form
of being regarding the bearer of that name. So if Quine claims that Pegasus
does not exist, such a philosopher might claim that by using the name ‘Pegasus’,
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Quine has nonetheless invoked the being of Pegasus in some way, contrary to
his intentions.
As a way of avoiding any such commitment, Quine turns to a strategy in-
spired by Russell’s account of definite descriptions, whereby Quine can logically
interpret his denial of Pegasus’ existence using a predicate such as ‘pegasizes’
that enables Quine to assert that nothing pegasizes, and thereby he does not
invoke the being of anything, except a predicate and possibly a universal [3,
p. 8]. This prompts Quine to generalize his strategy into a criterion of onto-
logical commitment: “To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be
reckoned as the value of a variable” [3, p. 13], more specifically as the value of
a bound variable in a theory where statements containing that bound variable
are taken to be true.
Noneists disagree at precisely this point. According to noneism, non-existent
objects can also be the value of bound variables. How many of the Seven
Dwarves were shorter than Snow White? All of them. How many of them were
bearded? Some of them. The answers to these questions can best be expressed
with reference to objects that are taken as the values of bound variables. How
many of these Seven Dwarves exist or existed at some time? None of them.
Consequently, ontological commitment must involve more than mere acceptance
of a theory invoking the value of a bound variable. Rather, an explicit assertion
of existence seems to be required to express ontological commitment, by means
of an existence predicate [14, 2].
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My initial approach in investigating this disagreement between Quine and none-
ists is not to question whether Quine was justified in his criterion for ontological
commitment. Rather, I begin by asking: What is it about variables and their
binding for Quine that results in ontological commitment when used in a the-
ory? To evaluate Quine’s criterion, it seems that the elements of that criterion
ought to be understood first. I begin with Quine’s account of variables and the
way in which they are bound.
Not surprisingly, a natural source to look for clarification of the nature of
variables is Quine’s article “The Variable”. There he asserts at the start, “The
variable qua variable, the variable an und fu¨r sich and par excellence, is the
bindable objectual variable” [10, p. 272]. Quine makes two important distinc-
tions relating to bound objectual variables.
The first distinction is between objectual variables and similar notions,
namely schematic letters on the one hand, and bindable substitutional vari-
ables on the other hand. Schematic letters are used as placeholders for elements
of a language in order to articulate the logical structure of statements, as in
‘p ∨ q’, where p and q are placeholders for logical clauses of arbitrary complex-
ity. Schematic letters “are not bindable, they are not objectual, and they do
not occur in sentences” [10, p. 272], whereas variables are and do.
Regarding bindable substitutional variables, Quine refers the reader to his
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bindable objectual occur in sentences
schematic letters no no no
substitutional variables yes no yes
objectual variables yes yes yes
Table 1: Quine’s distinction between objectual variables and similar devices
article “Reply to Professor Marcus”, where he discusses Ruth Marcus’ use of
substitutional variables p and q in “If p is a tautology, and p eq q, then q is
a tautology” [7, p. 178]. These bindable substitutional variables are of course
bindable, and they can occur in sentences, but they are not objectual. The
distinction that Quine makes here between substitutional and objectual uses of
variables is a reflection of his philosophy of the logic for truth conditions of the
logical quantifiers, in which he argues that a substitutional interpretation of the
quantifiers requires that everything substituted for bound variables be named
[12, pp. 88–89, 91–92]. Thus the consequence of the distinction that Quine is
pressing here appears to be that objectual variables can range over what is not
named.
This distinction between objectual variables and similar notions is summa-
rized in Table 1.
The second distinction is between two different forces in the logical quanti-
fiers that may be applied to objectual variables: quantitative force and binding
force. Quine claims that “the quantitative force of the quantifier, the ‘all’ and
‘some’, is irrelevant to the distinctive work of the bound variable and irrelevant
to its referential function” [10, p. 275]. What prompts Quine to make this dis-
tinction is that there is a more fundamental locution in English that appears
to carry the main force of binding variables, namely ‘such that’ as in ‘x such
that Fx ’, which is a construction that Quine elsewhere calls “term abstraction”
[11, p. 134]. Since “Other uses of the bound variable are readily represented
as parasitic upon this use” [10, p. 276], since ‘∃(x)F (x)’ can be read ‘Some
thing x such that x is F ’, it seems that the binding of variables by quantifiers
results from the term abstraction of the ‘such that’ locution rather than from
their pure quantitative force. After all, one need not be a noneist to insist that
the point of logical quantifiers is quantification, and that if the quantifiers have
any existential impact, this must be demonstrated rather than assumed. Quine
seems to concur here. The distinction that Quine makes between quantitative
force and binding force in the quantifiers, summarized in Table 2, can be seen
as the first step toward such a demonstration.
Quine pushes this distinction between quantitative and binding force fur-
ther by claiming that these two forces can be separated by means of predicate
functors. “Quantification can be thought of as application of a functor ‘∃’ or
‘∀’ to a predicate, and this functor is what carries the pure quantitative import,
with no intrusion of variables” [10, p. 276]. Here Quine extracts the inherent
quantitative force of the logical quantifiers by isolating this force as a pair of
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force locution
quantitative ‘all’ and ‘some’
binding ‘such that’
Table 2: Quine’s distinction between the different forces in logical quantifiers
predicate functors, where these functors have no binding force on variables at
all. To identify what remains of the logical quantifiers once this quantitative
force is separated, I turn to a Quine’s further development of predicate functor
logic to clarify what those variables intrude.
In “Variables Explained Away”, Quine shows how variables can be elimi-
nated completely by applying a series of predicate functors. Despite the provoca-
tive title, Quine assures his readers that his intentions with regard to the elim-
ination of variables are benign:
The interest in carrying out the elimination is that the device of the
variable thereby receives, in a sense, its full and explicit analysis.
There is no thought of denying ourselves the continuing convenience
of variables in practice. [6, p. 229]
As with case of logical quantifiers reinterpreted as predicate functors, where
the functions of the quantifiers were separated and clarified to reveal the pure
quantitative force inherent in the quantifiers, so with Quine’s efforts to eliminate
the variable, where the nature of the predicate functors that allow the variable to
be eliminated will elucidate the functions of the variable. All of these functions
will still be present in the resulting system, but will be distributed to separate
functors. One of these functors will represent the binding force of the ‘such that’
construction.
Quine identifies six functors:
Derelativization: (Der P)x 1 . . . xn-1 if and only if there is some-
thing xn such that Px 1 . . . xn.
Major inversion: (Inv P)x 1 . . . xn if and only if Pxnx 1 . . . xn-1.
Minor inversion: (inv P)x 1 . . . xn if and only if Px 1 . . .
xn-2xnxn-1.
Reflection: (Ref P)x 1 . . . xn-1 if and only if Px 1 . . . xn-1xn-1. [6,
p. 231]
Negation: (Neg P)x 1 . . . xm if and only if not (Px 1 . . . xm).
Cartesian multiplication: (P × Q)x 1 . . . xmy1 . . . yn if and only
if Px 1 . . . xm and Qy1 . . . yn. [6, p. 232]
Quine claims that these six functors “enable us to get rid of an existence prefix
and its associated variable when what the prefix governs is constructed by ‘not’
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and ‘and’, as complexly as you please, from any number of predications’ [6,
p. 232]. Here I understand Quine’s reference to the association of an existence
prefix to a variable as the mere binding of a variable in a ‘such that’ construction,
independent of any quantitative force, in accordance with Quine’s distinction
above.
These functors were promised to provide a “full and explicit analysis” of
the variable. Negation and Cartesian multiplication manage negation and com-
pound predication, while Major inversion, Minor inversion, and Reflection per-
mit the maneuvering of an individual variable in a list of variables to a position
at which Derelativization can remove the erstwhile variable. Since it is only by
the application of this latter functor that the variable actually goes away, the
Derelativization functor represents the binding force represented by the ‘such
that’ locution.
Consider Quine’s example from Methods of Logic:
Tom used to work for the man who murdered the second husband
of Tom’s youngest sister [11, p. 133]
Quine claims that this sentence amounts to the following:
Tom is (someone) x such that x used to work [for the man who
murdered the second husband of x ’s youngest sister] [11, p. 134]
I understand here that Tom is an object that is asserted to be the value of the
variable x. Suppose that additional variables are introduced for the sister, the
husband, and the murderer. Suppose further that I apply a series of predicate
functors. Successive applications of Quine’s Cartesian multiplication functor
can combine the various predicates ‘used to work for’, ‘murderer of’, ‘second
husband of’, and ‘youngest sister of’ into a single compound predicate. Judicious
application of the Major inversion, Minor inversion, and Reflection functors can
maneuver x to the appropriate position where the Derelativization functor could
be applied to eliminate x. The impact of the Derelativization functor is thus that
Tom is being characterized in a certain way in relation to others, where those
others are represented by the remaining variables that were not Derelativized,
and this is fundamentally the binding force of the ‘such that’ locution.
At this point I pause to note that this impact of Derelativization for objects
seems to be precisely what Meinong was articulating in his account of Sosein.
The distinction between Sein and Sosein arises from the contrast between judg-
ing and assuming, respectively [1, p. 81]. If I merely assume someone x worked
for the murderer of the second husband of x ’s younger sister, I have grasped
only Sosein, namely a characterization of something in a certain way in rela-
tion to others. When I judge that Tom is that someone, when I identify the
assumed object with an actual object, I grasp Sein. If it turns out that no one
ever worked for the murder of the second husband of that one’s youngest sister,
then this someone who was assumed does not exist, and what I have grasped in
my assumption turns out to be only Nichtsein rather than Sein, non-existence
rather than existence. Yet as Meinong says, “None of this alters the fact that
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the Sosein of an Object is not affected by its Nichtsein” [1, p. 82], since the
assumed object is still characterized in a certain way, even if the object does
not exist.
The ontological status of Sosein does not amount to subsistence, since
Meinong explicitly uses the distinction between Sein and Sosein, between judg-
ing and assuming, to show the inadmissibility of “the conjecture that wherever
existence is absent, it not only can be but must be replaced by subsistence” [1,
p. 81]. Accordingly, rather than considering them grades of being, one might
interpret Sein, Nichtsein, and Sosein as tags for logical objects, ways of class-
ing those objects according to whether they exist, do not exist, or are merely
categorized in some way, where the Sein and Nichtsein classes do not overlap,
but both may overlap with the Sosein class.
In Quinean terms, the function of Sosein thus appears to consist in the
mere binding of a variable to a predicate, which enables objects that are values
of those variables to be characterized in a certain way. So I claim that the
Derelativization functor might with some justice have been called Soseinization.
Returning to Quine and having clarified somewhat the nature of the binding
of objectual variables, I note that bound variables alone do not yield ontological
commitment for Quine. Rather, it is the pragmatics of accepting a scientific
theory in which objects take the value of those bound variables that represents
the key aspect of ontological commitment, not the logical structures through
which those objects flow. As Quine says:
Now how are we to adjudicate among rival ontologies? Certainly the
answer is not provided by the semantical formula “To be is to be the
value of a variable”; this formula serves rather, conversely, in testing
the conformity of a given remark or doctrine to a prior ontological
standard. [3, p. 15]
Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our
acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt,
at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme
into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted
and arranged. [3, p. 16]
The commitment in Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment is the com-
mitment to a scientific theory. This commitment implies a further commitment
to whatever objects that scientific theory characterizes by means of the ‘such
that’ construction that binds objects to variables. All the objects bound to that
scientific theory collectively constitute an ontology for Quine.
In explaining away Pegasus by means of the predicate ‘pegasizes’, and like-
wise with other non-existent objects, Quine thus appears to be asserting that
such objects have no proper role in fitting and arranging the disordered frag-
ments of raw experience, at least in his judgement. So presumably, if Pegasus
did have such a role, Quine would be obliged by his criterion to admit Pegasus
into his ontology.
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In Meinongian terms, the pragmatics in Quine’s criterion of ontological com-
mitment thus holds that mere Sosein is insufficient to establish existence, and
with this Meinong and noneists can easily agree. Yet Quine’s criterion appears
to make the stronger claim that no object tagged with Sosein but without Sein
will serve to fit and arrange the disordered fragments of raw experience, that
non-existent objects have no explanatory role. If they did have an explana-
tory role, they should appear as values of the bound variables in an accepted
theory that explains raw experience, but once they do, they would be subject
to Quinean ontological commitment and therefore would be accepted as exist-
ing, which is unacceptable regarding non-existent objects. This stronger claim
requires further investigation.
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I will start again from a different perspective.
Earlier I noted Quine’s characterization of his efforts to explain variables
away, that they serve to provide a “full and explicit analysis” of the function of
the variable. The same characterization might be applied to Quine’s efforts to
explain Pegasus away, namely that it provides a full and explicit analysis of the
function of the non-existent object Pegasus. What do those efforts reveal about
the function of non-existent objects in general?
In regard to the single predicate ‘pegasizes’, this does not reveal much at all,
except possibly:
NE1 Objects are sometimes used where there is no existing referent for names
of those objects.
Yet this is vacuous with regard to non-existent objects, and no special analysis
was needed to understand that. Perhaps the analysis is not yet full and explicit.
Quine resorts to the device ‘pegasizes’ mainly as a way to illustrate how his
strategy based on definite descriptions could be used to explain Pegasus away
even “If the notion of Pegasus had been so obscure or so basic a one that no
pat translation into a descriptive phrase had offered itself along familiar lines”
[3, p. 7]. Yet there is such a descriptive phrase that Quine himself offers: “the
winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon”. This description provides a
characterization in terms not only of qualities, but also in terms of relations to
another object. Pegasus is not only a horse and a winged one, but also stands
in a particular relation to Bellerophon, thereby distinguishing this winged horse
from other winged horses, assuming that Bellerophon captured one and only
one winged horse. Thus:
NE2 Objects are sometimes used to stand for complexes of qualities and re-
lations where there is no existing referent for names of those objects.
However, non-existent objects are rarely conjured just to describe them. What
about the relations to other objects that may form part of those descriptions?
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Consider now Bellerophon. Does he need to be explained away as well? If
one considers Bellerophon simply to be a character in myth, then it seems he
might similarly be explained away, presumably with a description other than
“he who captured Pegasus”, which would be circular in this context. This
description would likely reference other objects that themselves would need to
be explained away. All of these objects would be interconnected in a network
of relations. This suggests the unsurprising analysis:
NE3 Objects are sometimes used to tell stories that feature characters and
other elements that do not correspond to existing objects.
Yet it may be that Greek mythological heroes like Bellerophon have their
basis in actual culture heroes who did exist at one time, but whose lives and
exploits were subsequently elaborated to mythic proportions. Here one might
distinguish a mythic Bellerophon who gets explained away from a historical
Bellerophon who does not. The stories told of the mythic Bellerophon and Pe-
gasus would be kept distinct from the actual exploits of the historic Bellerophon.
A more interesting case would be one in which mythic stories are told of
historic individuals, perhaps by themselves. Suppose the historic Bellerophon
had claimed to have captured a flying horse near the Pirene fountain and that
the name of this horse was ‘Pegasus’. A contemporary skeptic hearing the
claim might demand to see the horse, whereupon Bellorophon might claim that
Pegasus subsequently escaped, taking with him the golden bridle that Athena
had given Bellerophon. The skeptic might persist and initiate a search for any
hoof marks around the Pirene fountain. Assuming that no hoof marks were
found, presumably Bellerophon could explain away the lack of hoof prints by
reference to mystic properties of flying horse’s hooves or some other convenient
excuse.
The point of this story within a story is that sometimes stories have practical
consequences outside of those stories. In this case, the story prompted a search
for hoof prints of a flying horse around a fountain. The search would presumably
not have occurred had the story note been told and would have been a different
sort of search had the story been told of a naiad in the fountain rather than
a flying horse standing near the fountain. Beyond this hypothetical story in
a story, I note that the fabled city of El Dorado and the Fountain of Youth
prompted actual expeditions, which might not have occurred or might have
been executed in different ways were it not for the particular stories that inspired
them.
Other practical consequences include artistic representation of non-existent
objects, such as the depiction of Pegasus in Greek pottery or sculpture or even
in the logo of a film studio. Indeed, that some philosopher would write about
explaining Pegasus away, thereby prompting other philosophers to write in re-
sponse, these might also be considered practical consequences. More consequen-
tially, one might consider any number of popular fictional characters that have
prompted significant economic activity around them, from best-selling books
to film adaptations to various bits of representational merchandise. This eco-
nomic activity involving existing people and industries would not have occurred
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or would not have occurred in the same way were it not for the nature of the
particular fictional characters and their subsequent popularity. Thus:
NE4 Objects are sometimes used to focus activity in a direction where no
existing object is present or is not yet present.
Nor is the impact of non-existent objects restricted to clearly fictional ones.
Scientific hypotheses sometimes posit classes of objects to explain phenomena.
Some of these objects are subsequently accepted as actually existing objects,
and some of them are shown to be non-existent. The scientific method typ-
ically requires physical experimentation to evaluate them, if they cannot be
argued away using thought experiments, and this physical experimentation will
be designed to search for evidence related to the nature of the specific scientific
posits. Such experiments would not have occurred or would have been designed
differently had those posits been different, even if those posits ultimately were
shown to involve non-existent objects.
The recent search for the Higgs boson is a case in point, requiring facilities
costing several billion Euros. Suppose that nothing corresponding to the de-
scription of the Higgs boson had been found, or that the evidence for what has
been identified as the Higgs boson is later interpreted as corresponding to some-
thing else. In that case, there would have been significant activity surrounding
the search for something that did not exist. It would not matter if something
else had been discovered in the process. A search for something is shaped by
what is sought. A search for something else would take a different form and
would have different practical consequences. Explaining the nature of a partic-
ular search seems to involve the object of the search in some way, whether that
object exists or not. Thus:
NE5 Objects are sometimes used to explain activity surrounding a particular
focus where there is no existing object.
Quine himself discusses such scientific posits, as well as the abstract entities
of mathematics: “Epistemologically these are myths on the same footing with
physical objects and gods, neither better nor worse except for differences in the
degree to which they expedite our dealings with sense experiences” [4, p. 45].
Yet if scientific posits, physical objects, and gods are on the same footing epis-
temologically, then so must be Pegasus, if Pegasus expedites our dealings with
sense experiences. The pragmatic issue for Quine must be how well such objects
help to fit and arrange “the disordered fragments of raw experience”, as quoted
earlier.
Even with purely fictional objects, I have been arguing that non-existent ob-
jects have practical consequences, often quite far-ranging consequences. Objects
are sometimes used to direct activity around them, whether the object exists
or not. Quine has a logical mechanism for explaining them away, but what
are the explanatory consequences once they are explained away? If nothing ‘el-
doradizes’, then what does the explanation of the various expeditions seeking El
Dorado look like, when so much activity seems to have been directed toward an
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object that did not exist? Quine notes that “...the essential utility of variables
is that they mark positions” [6, p. 230]. Without El Dorado as the value of a
bound variable to mark the position around which this activity is directed, the
resulting explanation of expeditions in search of El Dorado can only become
structurally much more complex, if such explanations can be formulated at all.
For Quine it must be an empirical matter whether El Dorado, the Fountain
of Youth, or Pegasus serve a sufficiently useful explanatory role in an opti-
mally parsimonious theory. Yet parsimony is not the only virtue of a theory, so
ontological parsimony must be balanced against explanatory power and other
factors. That a theory without Pegasus achieves this balance is something that
must be demonstrated not assumed. Unfortunately, the rhetoric in “On What
There Is” seems long on assumption and short on demonstration.
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I will start again from yet another perspective.
Quine has long argued for the indeterminacy of translation, the inscrutability
of reference, and ontological relativity, all of which point in the same direction
and which are all aspects of a single issue. Even within the same language,
objects can be described and understood differently and still serve the same
empirical role. Rabbits can alternatively be understood as rabbit-stages or
undetached rabbit parts [5, pp. 51–54][8, pp. 30–35], and this is not merely a
difference in words, but represents an ontological difference since the remaining
theory of the world will need to be adjusted according to how those particular
objects are understood.
Even where such an alternative translation does not easily come to mind,
ontological relativity can be realized by means of a proxy function, “a function
mapping the one universe into part or all of the other” [8, p. 55]. Thus given a
particular cat Tabitha, a proxy function can map Tabitha to “the whole cosmos
minus the cat” [13, p. 33]. With the whole cosmos similarly mapped, two equally
adequate theories of the world will result, but with radically different ontologies.
In Pursuit of Truth, Quine describes objects in terms of structural nodes
[13, pp. 24, 31, 33, 34] that ultimately are seen as ontologically neutral, given
ontological relativity. Regarding a rabbit or rabbit-stage or undetached rabbit
parts, “The stimulation remains as rabbity as ever, but the corresponding node
or object goes neutral and is up for grabs” [13, p. 34].
Yet it is not merely rabbits and cats whose nodes go neutral. It seems that
objects proposed in scientific hypotheses will also be subject to indeterminacy
of translation, inscrutability of reference, and ontological relativity, particularly
since they are even more remote from immediate sensory stimulus than are
rabbits and cats. So there will be neutral nodes for these objects as well. In
the hypothesis phase of scientific investigation, these nodes for hypothesized
objects will be connected to other objects in a theory that seeks to explain
sensory stimulation such as the measurements from scientific instruments. If
supported by further experimentation, the theory may be accepted, prompting
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ontological commitment to those objects, formerly hypothetical, now canonized
as existing, but still aligned to neutral nodes, given ontological relativity.
This network of neutral nodes within a theory represents the ontological cor-
relate of the empirical holism that Quine articulates starting in “Two Dogmas
of Empiricism”. There he suggests that “our statements about the external
world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corpo-
rate body” [4, p. 41]. If a single statement cannot be verified on its own, then
no single statement in an explanatory theory can be revised on its own either.
Thus revising one statement will require the revision of the other statements
to a greater or lesser extent, where some statements such as mathematical ones
are considered to be more central to this holistic system and are therefore less
subject to revision than others at the periphery.
Neutral nodes reflected in these statements are likewise subject to this holism.
The neutral nodes in the network each serve an explanatory role within the
whole, such that if one node is reinterpreted or explained away, the interpre-
tation of all the other nodes must be adjusted accordingly. Economies in the
network might be realized by eliminating nodes that serve no explanatory role
in that they have no impact on the network, or possibly by consolidating multi-
ple nodes into one where there are explanatory redunancies. Likewise, it seems
that inadequacies in the network might be realized by recognizing that there
are gaps in the network such that the explanatory value of the entire network
increases with the addition of a new node.
Suppose that I have certain rabbity stimulation in several of my senses, and
so do other people in circumstances relevantly similar as those that occassioned
my stimulation. To explain this, perhaps I perversely postulate “rabbithood
projection forces” emanating from myself and from these other people that tri-
angulate at a given spatiotemporal location where no existing object is located.
These forces make it seem as though there is a rabbit where there is none.
This postulation would thus economize on my commitment to rabbits in my
ontology, but at the cost of obliging me to adjust my hypothesis to account for
other evidence that may arise, such as certain indentations in my lawn and the
disappearance of certain carrots. Eventually, my “rabbithood projection force”
hypothesis may become so strained that it becomes clear to me that all of this
stimulation is most economically explained by a node strategically placed in the
network, a node that I will call a rabbit according to ancestral usage.
This example can also be run in the opposite direction. Suppose I already
have a rabbit as a node in my network, and I want to explain it away. I might
try to explain it away by introducing “rabbithood projection forces”, as just
described. Even if such attempts to explain the rabbit away succeed, the rest of
the network will need to do more work to compensate for the missing rabbit, so
I might ask myself: Where has the system gained any economy by explaining it
away? Mere ontological parsimony may ultimately represent a false economy.
In the previous section, I argued that non-existent objects have practical
consequences for existent objects. As quoted earlier, Quine acknowledges that
gods are epistemologically on the same footing as mathematical abstractions
and physical objects, and I extend the same courtesy to Pegasus, so the same
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considerations that were afforded to a physical object like a rabbit in my ex-
planatory network of nodes should be afforded to Pegasus. If I can gain economy
in my network with the inclusion of a node for Pegasus, then I should add that
node as easily as I added the node for the rabbit. The sensory stimulation for
the Pegasus node will be far more indirect than it was for the rabbit node, rep-
resented mainly by various actions that people take in speaking about Pegasus
and representing him, without me actually having any direct Pegasus stimulus,
but perfectly respectable scientific abstractions need to take similar detours to
reach actual sensory stimulus as well.
If Pegasus were accepted as a node in my network, represented by an object
taken as a value of a bound variable in my theory, if I accept Quine’s criterion of
ontological commitment, I would be forced to accept the existence of Pegasus,
even if I know Pegasus is merely fictional. This is clearly unacceptable, not
merely to Quine. Thus it seems natural for Quine to want Pegasus to be purged
from the network of nodes, but with Pegasus goes any explanatory value and
economy that Pegasus brings to the network. For non-existent objects that pro-
vide exceptionally strong explanatory value, this absence might be unacceptable
as well.
My countersuggestion is to accept that some neutral nodes are hollow, in
that there is no existing object at such a node. Rather, the node serves to
acknowledge the focus of activity around a point in the network, providing a
mechanism to increase the explanatory economy of the entire network, where
no existing object can be recognized at that node. This suggestion effectively
revokes Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, since it allows all objects
to serve as neutral nodes in an explanatory network, not merely objects to whose
existence I am committed. All of these objects will merely have been tagged
with Sosein by virtue of being described within the explanatory theory, using
Meinong’s terminology. However, the nodes need also to be tagged with Sein or
Sosein to indicate whether a given node serves as an existing object or merely
as a locus of activity without an existing object there. This is what noneists
have been arguing.
In reference to the ontologies of philosophers who advocate the inclusion of
unactualized possibles, Quine characterizes such a universe as “unlovely”, of-
fending “the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes”, a
“slum”, and “a breeding ground for disorderly elements” [3, p. 4]. Those who
propose the clearing of non-metaphorical slums often forget that the occupants
of those slums need to go somewhere else. Often physical slum clearers even-
tually also propose building housing projects where the problems of the slums
get translated via social proxy functions to the new housing projects. Given his
holism, Quine might have proposed a criterion according to which Pegasus and
other non-existent objects might truly be explained away, namely when their
elimination requires no adjustment of the explanatory network of nodes. If such
an adjustment is required, then it seems that the objects represent more than
nothing, though perhaps not actually something. However, at the point at which
he formulated his criterion of ontological commitment, Quine appears merely
to have assumed that no such adjustment would be required in the case of Pe-
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gasus, or perhaps he underestimated the consequences that some non-existent
objects can have, or perhaps he did not yet realize the kind of holist that he
was becoming.
The problem for Quine and his taste for desert landscapes is the existence of
humans, who have the unfortunate tendency to think of objects that do not exist,
and this kind of thinking sometimes has significant practical consequences, as I
have been arguing. Regarding the possible fat man in the doorway that Quine
considers one of the disorderly elements in the slum, part of the responsibility for
making this possible fat man ontologically problematic rests with Quine himself.
Setting aside the universe of unactualized possibles that Quine was explicitly
addressing, according to the line of argument developed here, the act of Quine
merely thinking about using the possible fat man in the doorway as an example
in his article “On What There Is” have consequences that require explanation,
such as an explanation for certain of Quine’s neurons behaving one way or
the other. At this point, these consequences seem minimal, so perhaps the
explanation could have been taken an adverbial form, namely that the neurons
had been behaving ‘possible-fat-man-in-the-doorway-ishly’. However, having
given lectures and having written about the possible fat man in the doorway,
Quine leaves a trace of him in print, thereby inducing others to think very
hard about the possible fat man in the doorway, prompting some to write in
response to Quine. If Quine had kept his mouth shut and his pen still, the
explanatory impact of the possible fat man in the doorway might have been
negligible, but he did not. Indeed, any number of fat men could be possible
in any number of doorways without registering any impact at all, but once one
of them is discussed in speech or writing, even in vague terms, that act and
its consequences require some explanation, in which the possible fat man in
the doorway will most naturally feature as a node around which this activity
revolves.
This investigation has progressed through several stages:
1. An inquiry into the logical apparatus by which Quine explains Pegasus
away noted a separation of the quantitative force of logical quantifiers from
their binding force, the latter of which is contained in the locution ‘such
that’. I argued that this binding force is essentially the same as Meinong’s
Sosein designation, where Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment
appears to claim that no object with Sosein but not Sein can have any
role in explaining experience.
2. Quine’s interpretation of his efforts to explain variables away was applied
in turn to his efforts to explain Pegasus away, to reveal the function of non-
existent objects. This line of inquiry developed the argument that non-
existent objects sometimes have very significant practical consequences
beyond the bounds of mere fiction, and that these consequences require
explanation.
3. These results were placed in the framework of Quine’s image of neutral
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nodes in an explanatory network, an image that emerges from his argu-
ments for ontological relativity and his holism. This framework seems to
require that if nodes that have practical consequences are removed from
the network, then other nodes will need to absorb whatever work those
nodes had been performing. If non-existent objects do have consequences
sufficient to merit inclusion in an explanatory theory, then Quine’s cri-
terion of ontological commitment would require the commitment to the
existence of non-existent objects. An alternative was suggested whereby
these neutral nodes must further be tagged as either existing or not exist-
ing.
This investigation does not establish that Quine’s criterion of ontological
commitment is mistaken, but it does point out the costs of maintaining it come
what may. Regarding some non-existent objects, the cost may be quite high.
The practical consequences that non-existent objects have for existing objects
put pressure on the network of neutral nodes associated with an explanatory
theory. It may indeed be possible to explain non-existent objects away, but
given Quine’s holism, so may existing objects be explained away. In either case,
the work done by objects that are explained away, whether existing or not,
will need to be distributed elsewhere in the network of nodes. The pragmatic
question is whether the resulting theory pays for its ontological parsimony with
insupportable structural excesses.
If the practical consequences of non-existent objects are as significant as I
have argued, then Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment seems to force
him into the dilemma of either accepting the existence of non-existent objects,
possibly thereby ruining the good old word ‘exist’, or accepting an excessively
cumbersome formulation of an explanatory theory from which non-existent ob-
jects have been expunged. The way out would be to accept that some objects
exist and some do not, which is the noneist way. Once this is accepted, though,
the rest of the Quinean system seems to adjust quite nicely, as expected under
Quinean holism. One might thereby consider Quine’s efforts to explain non-
existent objects away analogously with his work on explaining variables away:
It can be done, but there is no thought of denying ourselves the continuing
convenience of non-existent objects in practice.
On balance, I am inclined to agree with Routley. Some things do not exist,
like Pegasus, and it is not clear that they can simply be explained away without
any consequences.
References
[1] Meinong, A. (1960). The Theory of Objects. Levi, I., Terrell, D. B., and
Chisholm, R. (trans.). In Chisholm, R. (ed.). (1960). Realism and the Back-
ground of Phenomenology. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. pp. 76–117.
[2] Priest, G. (2005). Toward Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Inten-
tionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14
[3] Quine, W. V. (1948). On what there is. In Quine, W. V. (1980) From a
Logical Point of View (2nd ed., revised). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press. pp. 1–19.
[4] Quine, W. V. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. In Quine, W. V. (1980)
From a Logical Point of View (2nd ed., revised). Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press. pp. 20–46.
[5] Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
[6] Quine, W. V. (1960). Variables explained away. in Quine, W. V. (1995).
Selected Logic Papers (enlarged ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press. pp. 227–235.
[7] Quine, W. V. (1961). Reply to Professor Marcus. in Quine, W. V. (1995).
Selected Logic Papers (enlarged ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press. pp. 177–184.
[8] Quine, W. V. (1968). Ontological Relativity. in Quine, W. V. (1969). On-
tological Relativity and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press. pp. 26–68.
[9] Quine, W. V. (1970). Algebraic logic and predicate functors. In Quine, W.
V. (1976). The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (revised and enlarged
ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 272–282.
[10] Quine, W. V. (1972). The variable. In Quine, W. V. (1976). The Ways
of Paradox and Other Essays (revised and enlarged ed.). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press. pp. 283–307.
[11] Quine, W. V. (1982). Methods of Logic (4th ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
[12] Quine, W. V. (1986). Philosophy of Logic (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
[13] Quine, W. V. (1992). Pursuit of Truth (revised ed.). Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
[14] Routley, R. (1966). Some Things Do Not Exist. Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic 7 (3):251–276.
[15] Routley, R. (1980) Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond. Canberra: Re-
search School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
[16] Routley, R. (1982). On What There Is Not. Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research 43 (2):151–177.
http://www.markressler.com/doc/Pegasus-Explained-Away.pdf
15
